During the third ten-day period of April 2025, the early warning agrometeorological forecast anticipates continued weather characterized by low rainfall and rising temperatures. This forecast contrasts sharply with the same period last year, which experienced heavy rainfall that led to flash floods in the Southern Uplands and Hadhramaut.
here is an increased risk of reduced crop and livestock yields for the upcoming season. This is exacerbated by Yemen's heavy reliance on imports, rising food prices, and deteriorating food security.
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In 2024, SARD reached 292,866 individuals across northwest Syria and Türkiye’s Adıyaman Province. This report highlights the collective impact of our teams, partners, and donors over the past year—spanning the sectors of Shelter, Protection, Early Recovery, and more.
In the second ten-day period of April 2025, the early warning agrometeorological forecast predicts ongoing weather variability with increased precipitation across various Southern Uplands governorates. This could impact current agricultural activities and the development of seasonal crops.
An estimated 11.5 million people have been uprooted within Sudan, and 3.5 million forced to flee into neighbouring countries including Chad, Egypt, South Sudan, Ethiopia, Libya and Uganda (UN OCHA, IOM).
Food insecurity in Government of Yemen (GoY) controlled areas reached a record high in February, amidst a general worsening of the situation nationwide.
With the deteriorating economic conditions, Ramadhan festivities have become less normal for most Yemenis as they struggle to afford them. This comes at a time of decline in the value of the local currency in GoY controlled areas , along with rising prices of basic food items and reduced income earning opportunities.
According to the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), about 19.5 million people are projected to need humanitarian assistance in 2025, including 17.1 million (almost half of the population) facing acute food insecurity.
Since the start of 2025, 859 trucks carrying aid from seven UN agencies have crossed from Türkiye to Syria—more than eight times the number during the same period last year.
This Area-Based Assessment (ABA) was conducted to identify the critical needs and priorities1 of affected populations through a combination of household (HH) surveys, key informant (KI) interviews, and focus group discussions (FGDs).
On 2 March, Israeli authorities announced a halt to humanitarian aid entering Gaza, jeopardizing progress made in delivering vital, lifesaving assistance since the ceasefire took effect on 19 January.
On 18 February, the Israel Army withdrew from remaining population centres in southern Lebanon, while maintaining presence in five strategic positions along the Blue Line. The Lebanese Armed Forces deployed into vacated areas, supporting population returns.
The LRP targets 1.5 million vulnerable Lebanese, 1.3 million displaced Syrians, 145,000 Palestine Refugees in Lebanon and 23,026 Palestinian Refugees from Syria.
918,769 people displaced within Lebanon back in their cadaster of origin while 115,234 people remain displaced outside their cadaster of origin as of 12 February.
With the escalation of the conflict in September 2024, disruptions to the local economy such as trade, tourism and agricultural production, displacement and limited humanitarian access have emerged a significant compounding factor affecting directly, or indirectly food insecurity of most Lebanese and refugees in the country.
The situation in South Lebanon remains volatile, marked during the reporting period by the attempts of thousands of residents to return to villages in areas along the Blue Line where the Israeli Army maintained its presence.
In the span of just four days following the long-awaited ceasefire on 19 January, more than 8,000 mt of WFP food assistance has entered Gaza without incident, exceeding the total food aid delivered into Gaza during the first two weeks of January.
Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes are expected to persist through at least May in the South, El Nabatieh, Baalbak-El Hermel, Akkar, and North Lebanon governorates due to extensive infrastructure damage, the investment needed to restore key economic sectors, and the cumulative effects of the year-long conflict.
Crisis (IPC Phase 3) area-level outcomes are expected to persist in the South, El Nabatieh, Baalbak-El Hermel, Akkar, and North Lebanon governorates given the level of infrastructure destruction to date and the level of investment required to rehabilitate key economic sectors.
